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THE ORIGINAL WRIT OF MANDAMUS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
JAMES R. NORVELL* AND RONALD L. SUTTONt
JURISDICTION

While the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Courts of Civil
Appeals are primarily appellate tribunals, both courts are vested with
jurisdiction to issue original writs under circumstances set out in constitutional and statutory enactments. The Supreme Court and the
justices thereof are expressly empowered by the Texas Constitution to
issue the writs of mandamus, procedendo, certiorari, as may be necessary to enforce its jurisdiction.' The Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
possess a similar power by virtue of statutory enactment.2 In addition
to the provision authorizing the issuance of writs to enforce its jurisdiction, the Constitution empowers the Legislature to "confer original
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto and
mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the
Governor of the State. ' 3 Acting under this power, the Legislature has
adopted four statutory enactments, namely, Articles 1733, 1734, 1735
and 1735a which provide:
Art. 1733. The Supreme Court or any Justice thereof, shall
have power to issue writs of procedendo, certiorari and all writs
of quo warranto or mandamus agreeable to the principles of law
regulating such writs, against any district judge, or Court of Civil
Appeals or judges thereof, or any officer of the State Government,
except the Governor.
Art. 1734. Said Court or any judge thereof in vacation may issue
the writ of mandamus to compel a judge of the district court to
proceed to trial and judgment in a cause agreeably to the principles and usages of law, returnable to the Supreme Court on or
before the first day of the term, or during the session of the same,
or before any judge of the said Court as the nature of the case
may require.
Art. 1735. The Supreme Court only shall have power, authority
or jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus or injunction or any
other mandatory or compulsory writ or process against any of the
* Research Professor of Law, deceased, School of Law, St. Mary's University of San
Antonio, Texas.
t Briefing Attorney, Supreme Court of Texas.
1 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3.
2 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1823 (1964).
3 TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 3.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 2, Art. 2
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1: 177

officers of the, executive departments of the government of this
state and also the Board of County and District Road Indebtedness
to order or compel the pefformance of any act or duty which, by
the laws of this state, they, or either of them, are authorized to
perform, whether such act or duty be judicial, ministerial or
discretionary.
Art. 1735a. The Supreme Court or any court of civil appeals
shall have jurisdiction and authority to issue the writ of mandamus,
or any other mandatory or compulsory writ or process, against any
public officer or officer of a political party, or any judge or clerk of
an election, to compel the performance, in accordance with the
laws of this state, of any duty imposed upon them, respectively, by
law, in connection with the holding of any general, special, or
primary election or any convention of a political party. Any proceeding seeking to obtain such a writ shall be conducted in accordance with the rules pertaining to original proceedings in the court
wherein the petition is filed. When presented to a court of civil
appeals, any petition pertaining to an election on an office or proposition which is voted on by the voters of the entire state shall be
presented to the court of the supreme judicial district in which the
respondent resides, or in which one of the respondents resides, if
there is more than one, and any petition pertaining to an election
on an office or proposition which is voted on by the voters of only
a portion of the state shall be presented to the court of a supreme
judicial district in which the territory covered by the election or
a portion thereof is located. A petition presented to a court of
civil appeals which pertains to a precinct or county convention
shall be presented to the court of the supreme judicial district in
which the precinct or county is located; a petition pertaining to a
district convention shall be presented to the court of a supreme
judicial district in which the district or a portion thereof is located;
and a petition pertaining to a state convention shall be presented
to the court of a supreme judicial district in which the respondent
resides, or in which one of the respondents resides, if there is
more than one.
The constitutional provision relating to the jurisdiction of the
Texas Courts of Civil Appeals to issue original writs simply provides
that, "Said courts [of civil appeals] shall have such other jurisdiction,
original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law." 4 In addition to

Article 1823 authorizing the issuance of writs to enforce its jurisdiction, the Legislature has authorized the courts of civil appeals (or
any judge thereof, in vacation) to "issue the writ of mandamus to com4 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3.
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pel a Judge of the District or County Court to proceed to trial and
judgment in a cause, returnable as the nature of the case may require."'.
The supreme court and the courts of civil appeals have concurrent
jurisdiction in certain areas. Both types of courts may issue writs of
mandamus to protect their jurisdiction, order a district judge to proceed with the trial of a cause, or issue a writ in an election proceeding.
The court of civil appeals, however, has the exclusive jurisdiction to
order a county judge to proceed with the trial of a cause. 6 Whenever a
court of civil appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with the Texas
Supreme Court, the general but not invariable rule is that application
for relief should be first made to the court of civil appeals and if this
is not done, the supreme court may refuse to consider an application
for mandamus.7 Under extraordinary circumstances, particularly where
time is an important factor, the supreme court may consider an applica8
tion although no relief was first requested of a court of civil appeals.
The original mandamus power of the Texas Supreme Court is much
broader than that vested in either the courts of civil appeals or the
court of criminal appeals. The limited mandamus power of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals9 is somewhat of an anachronism and is inconsistent with the civil-criminal division of jurisdiction between the two
highest Texas courts. However, it is the supreme court and not the
court of criminal appeals that is vested with the power to order a
district judge to proceed with the trial of a criminal case.' 0
While the constitutional provision relating to the original jurisdiction of the supreme court does not expressly limit the court's
authority to issue writs to those cases involving no fact issues, it has
been categorically stated that, except in those cases where it is necessary to determine some factual matter relating to the court's jurisdiction,"' the mandamus power of the court extends only to questions of
law. In Depoyster v. Baker 12 the relator Depoyster sought mandamus
5 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1824 (1964).
6 Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1734 (1962) and art. 1824 (1964).
7 Houtchens v. Mercer, 119 Tex. 244, 27 S.W.2d 795 (1930); Dallas Railway 9- Terminal

Co. v. Watkins, 126 Tex. 116, 86 S.W.2d 1081 (1935).
8 Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 2 v. Blalock, 157 Tex. 206, 301
S.W.2d 593 (1957); State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939).
9 The writ is restricted to enforcing the jurisdiction of the court. "The Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writ of habeas
corpus and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, issue such writs as may
be necessary to enforce its own jurisdiction." TEX. CONST. art. V. § 5.
10 State ex rel Moreau v. Bond, 114 Tex. 468, 271 S.W. 379 (1925).
11 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1732 (1962); Smirl v. Globe Laboratories, 144 Tex. 41,
188 S.W.2d 676 (1945); Tarpley v. Epperson, 125 Tex. 63, 79 S.W.2d 1081 (1935).
12 89 Tex. 155, 34 S.W. 106 (1896).
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in the Supreme Court against A. J. Baker, Commissioner of the General
Land Office, to compel Baker to issue a certificate under a statute. The
application was refused and the Texas Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brown, held that a discretionary act, that is, one
involving the exercise of the judgment of the Land Commissioner upon
the facts and the law of the case, was involved and it was not the
province of the supreme court to examine the records in the Land Commissioner's office to determine whether or not the Commissioner had
arrived at a correct conclusion.
In discussing the power and authority to issue a writ of mandamus
where the determination of fact issues is involved, Justice Brown
pointed out that:
This court is not provided with the means of ascertaining the
facts in any controversy. It has none of the powers conferred by
law upon the district court to take depositions, issue subpoenas,
writs of attachment, or other process necessary to the trial of
issues of fact; and in this court the right of trial by jury, which is
secured by the constitution to every person demanding it, could
not be accorded. We therefore conclude that it was not the intention of the framers of the constitution or the legislature to empower
this court to issue writs of mandamus, except where3 the facts were
undisputed, and the right clear and unquestioned.'
Since the decision in Depoyster, there have been a number of decisions which categorically state that the Texas Supreme Court has no
power to determine fact issues in connection with an application for
14
mandamus or other original writs.
CIRCUMSTANCES RESTRICTING THE USE OF THE WRIT

Mandamus will issue only in those cases where there is no other
adequate remedy. Hence, there are numerous situations in which mandamus is unavailable because of this rule. When remedy by appeal is
adequate, the writ will not issue.' 5 And in accordance with the general

rule applicable to mandamus, the writ will not lie to control discretion.'6 Only those actions which are classified as ministerial come
within the ambit of mandamus.' 7 The writ is not available to compel
13 Id. at 160, 34 S.W. at 108.
14 Rogers v. Lynn, 121 Tex. 467, 49 S.W.2d 709 (1932); Wooten v. Rogan, 96 Tex. 434,

73 S.W. 799 (1903).
15 Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 60 S.W. 665 (1901); Smith v. Conner, 98 Tex. 434, 84
S.W. 815 (1905).
16 Rush v. Browning, 103 Tex. 649, 132 S.W. 763 (1910).
'7

Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457, 55 Am. Dec. 791 (1851). In Commissioner of the Gen-
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a trial court to set aside an order of severance as any error that might
be involved in ordering the severance could be taken by appeal.18
Similarly, mandamus will not lie to compel a County Clerk to correct
an order so as to reflect that relator had not appeared at a condemnation hearing and had received no notice of a decision and award until
after the time for filing objections had expired. In this situation, the
remedy is by bill of review.' 9 Since the 1953 amendments to Articles
1728 and 1821, mandamus will no longer issue to compel the courts of
civil appeals to certify a question of law to the supreme court for
decision in a plea of privilege cause because if there is a conflict of
decisions, the case may reach the supreme court by writ of error.20 As a
general rule, an original writ of mandamus will not issue from the
supreme court if relief may be afforded by a district court.2 ' The Texas
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to issue an original writ of
injunction except as it might be ancillary to some relief which it is
authorized to grant, and mandamus will not issue commanding an
22
officer to perform an act which he is willing to perform.
EXPUNGING VOID ORDERS-ARTICLE

1733

Under the power vested in the Texas Supreme Court by the provisions of Article 1733, the writ of mandamus is commonly used to
require the vacation or expunging of a void as distinguished from an
erroneous order of a lower court. An order is void when issued by a
court having no jurisdiction or authority to issue the same, 23 when such
order is violative of some constitutional right of a party, or is issued
as a result of an abuse of discretion by a judicial officer. It lies within
the absolute discretion of a trial judge to grant a new trial, and a court
of civil appeals has no power to control this discretion, hence an order
eral Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471, 479 (1849) Mr. Justice Wheeler pointed out the
distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts:
The distinction between ministerial and judicial and other official acts seems to be
that where the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision
and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is
ministerial; but where the act to be done involves the exercising of discretion or
judgment in determining whether the duty exists, it is not to be deemed merely
ministerial.
18 Burke v. Loughridge, 314 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ).
The court of civil appeals also pointed out that it had no authority to grant the relief
prayed for, namely, to order a trial court to set aside a severance order.
19 Littlejohn v. Carroll, 342 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, no writ).
20 Williams v. Murray, 162 Tex. 616, 350 S.W.2d 332 (1961).
21 Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation District v. Belcher, 139 Tex. 368, 163
S.W.2d 183 (1942).
22 Lane v. Ross, 151 Tex. 268, 249 S.W.2d 591 (1952).
23 State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939).
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of a court of civil appeals directing a trial judge to set aside its order
granting a new trial is wholly unauthorized and the Texas Supreme
Court may by mandamus order the court of civil appeals to expunge
its void order. 24 A district court is not authorized to interfere with a
condemnation proceeding and a mandamus ordering a vacation of an
order so interfering may be rendered.2
A mandamus requiring a trial judge to vacate an order which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court or the result of an abuse
of discretion has been issued in a great variety of cases. Among these
are orders directing a district court to vacate an order staying proceedings under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, when
the trial court under all the circumstances of the case should have
ordered a separate trial of a severable action that did not involve the
26
person who would be entitled to a stay under the Congressional Act;
to vacate an order restraining a party appointed by another court as
acting sheriff in an ouster proceeding from performing his duties as
sheriff; 27 to vacate an order restraining a district attorney from enforcing a Sunday closing law; 28 to expunge an order directing a party
to disclose her income tax returns when it appeared that the district
judge had not previously examined the returns and determined what
portions thereof were material to the case; 29 to require a district judge
to vacate an order entered prior to the trial of a divorce suit commanding a husband to pay certain expenses and attorney's fees incurred
or to be incurred by the wife, as such order was beyond the power of
the court (the order was interlocutory and non-appealable and mandamus was the only available remedy);3 0 to set aside an order granting
a motion for new trial, which order was void because rendered after
the motion for new trial had been overruled by operation of law.8 1
Under the general heading of Pre-Trial Procedure, the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure contain a number of discovery rules which may
operate in a harsh and drastic manner under certain circumstances.
The purpose of the rules is to implement the theory that law suits
should be tried and the rights of litigants determined with all cards
,.24 Johnson v. Court of Civil Appeals, 162 Tex. 613, 350 S.W.2d 330 (1961).
25 State v. Giles, 368 S.W,2d 943 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
26 Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 291 S.W.2d 677 (1956).
27 State of Texas v. Gary, 163 Tex. 565, 359 S.W.2d 456 (1962).
28 Crouch v. Craik, 369 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
29 Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959).
80 Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 348 S.W.2d 523 (1961).
31 Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Sup. 1968). See also, Buttery v. Betts, 422 S.W.2d
149 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
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upon the- table, so to speak. Certain clauses and provisions in these
discovery rules were adopted as a result of compromises between those
attorneys who usually represent claimants and those who generally
represent defendants. However, despite the natural differences of viewpoint, it is safe to say that both sides joined with other disinterested
persons such as judges and instructors in law in devising a plan which
would in the main promote greater accuracy and effectiveness in the
administration of justice by our courts. It was recognized, however,
that discovery, if not properly controlled and directed, could become
an instrument of harassment and oppression. For that reason, the Texas
Supreme Court adopted Rule 186b which vests district judges with a
substantial discretionary authority to curb unwarranted and oppressive
attempts at discovery by deposition. This rule provides that after
hearing, the trial judge may order that a deposition not be taken, or
that it be taken under such circumstances as the court may direct,
32
including a restriction that certain matters shall not be inquired into.

If, after applying to the trial judge for relief from oppressive discovery, a litigant is still dissatisfied, he may under a special and admittedly unusual set of facts, obtain relief in the supreme court.
Obviously, any order rendered by a trial judge, either granting, modifying or refusing a demand for discovery, is interlocutory and hence
cannot be appealed 33 although it may serve as a point of error upon an
appeal taken from a final judgment in the case. It is primarily the func82 TEx. R. Civ. P. 186b as amended March 19, 1957, effective September 1, 1957, reads as
follows:
Notice to take the deposition of a party or a witness upon written or oral interrogatories, other than depositions under Rule 187, shall not be given, served or published
prior to appearance day, unless leave of court has been obtained upon a sworn motion
showing good cause therefor, which leave may be granted with or without notice as
the court may require. After notice is served for taking a deposition on written interrogatories or by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by
the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken,
or that it may be taken only before the court or at some designated place other than
that stated in the notice or subpoena, or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that it may be taken only by oral examination, or that certain matters
shall not be inquired into, or that the examination shall be held with no one present
except the witness and his counsel and the parties to the action and their officers and
counsel, or that the deposition shall not be taken by or before the officer having the
commission, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order
of the court, or that secret processes, developments or research need not be disclosed
or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the court may
make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from
undue annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or expense.
33 As to attempted appeals from interlocutory orders where there is no statute providing
for an appeal, see McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265
(1957).
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tion of the supreme court to review causes decided by the fourteen
courts of civil appeals in the state, and not to stand behind trial judges
as an umpire to immediately second guess the numerous decisions
necessarily made by a trial judge with reference to interlocutory rulings
made during the course of a trial. This would not only interfere with
the proper function of the supreme court but constitute a waste of
time as the great majority of these rulings are either correct, lie within
the ambit of the trial court's discretion or are harmless. And, even those
which could be classified as prejudicial may be corrected on appeal without any further harm resulting to a litigant other than that delay necessarily incident to the appellate process. There are situations, however,
when the discovery of a certain document may in itself cause irreparable
harm to a litigant and if no light is thrown upon the issues in dispute
by the document, protective measures are in order and if these are not
forthcoming in the trial court, relief may be had in the supreme court.
A court order which if enforced would infringe upon a right protected by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of
Texas, is not merely erroneous but void and subject to collateral attack
by habeas corpus. 4 The Texas Supreme Court has also construed
Article 173311 as authorizing mandamus compelling a trial judge to
nullify and expunge an order which is repugnant to a valid statutory
6
enactment.3
A leading authority relating to the function of the Texas Supreme
Court in original mandamus cases is Crane v. TunksY7 Mrs. Crane had
sued P. J. Glenney, a former employee, for money which Glenney had
allegedly overdrawn from his salary account and otherwise obtained
by fraud. Glenney sought discovery under Rule 73738 and prayed for
a court order directing Mrs. Crane to produce for his examination a
rather extensive list of documents, including income tax records for
the years 1939 to 1958, the date of the filing of the bill of discovery.
34 Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948).
35 See text of article set forth at page 177.

38 In State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939), the trial court had enjoined
the Texas Department of Public Safety from enforcing those provisions of the Penal Code
which proscribed the use of the highways by motor trucks transporting loads in excess of
the weight limits set by statute. The trial court's order forbade the enforcement of a
valid legislative enactment and was declared void for that reason.
37 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959).
38 TEx. R. Civ. P. 737 provides:
All trial courts shall entertain suits in the nature of bills of discovery, and grant
relief therein in accordance with the usages of courts of equity. Such remedy shall be
cumulative of all other remedies. In actions of such nature, the plaintiff shall have the
right to have the defendant examined on oral interrogatories, either by summoning
him to appear for examination before the trial court as in ordinary trials, or by
taking his oral deposition in accordance with the general rules relating thereto.
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The trial court granted discovery as prayed for with the exception of
the income tax returns for the years 1939 through 1949 and another
item deemed immaterial to the case. Discovery was allowed, however,
as to the returns for 1950 to 1958, inclusive. The court also ordered
Mrs. Crane's attorney specifically to deliver her 1950 return to
Glenney's attorney for examination. The attorney refused to obey this
order. The supreme court pointed out that the discovery order was
interlocutory and that no appeal could be taken therefrom until final
judgment had been rendered in the cause. However, the court said:
To require relators to proceed with the trial of the main cause
and bring up the question of the validity of the trial court's order
to turn over the income tax return of Mrs. Crane for the years
1950-1958 would be to deprive relators of any remedy from an
erroneous ruling of the court. After the returns had been inspected, examined and reproduced by respondent a holding that
the court had erroneously issued the order would be of small comfort to relators in protecting their papers. The question of the
legality of the court's order would become an academic one, and
the objection to the order would be moot.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Calvert (now Chief Justice) said:
The other order which relators seek to have vacated or revised is
the order directing delivery to Glenney's counsel of the 1950 income tax return for examination and copying. My agreement with
the majority that the entry of that order constituted an abuse of
discretion is not based upon the failure of the judge to inspect the
return before ordering it delivered up for examination and copying, however more cautious and desirable that might have been,
but is based upon the fact that the record before us shows clearly
that the return contains much information of a purely private
nature which is not relevant and material to any issue in the main
cause. In this state of the record it would be an unreasonable invasion of Mrs. Crane's right of privacy to require her to disclose
information concerning strictly personal affairs to Glenney's
counsel.
Mr. Justice Smith in a dissenting opinion took the position that the
proper and exclusive remedy in the situation was the writ of habeas
corpus which would afford relief whenever one was incarcerated under
a void order.
While the opinions in the Tunks case do not specifically mention or
cite the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 89
39 Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 189, 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 2, Art. 2
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1: 177

nor article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution,40 it seems rather clear that
the broad order of the district court violated such constitutional provisions. One has a right to be secure in his paper and free from unwarranted disclosures. When, therefore, it appears that documents or
papers which bear no relation to the issues of the cause are sought to
be disclosed by the discovery process, the order is void at least to the
extent that there is an unwarranted disclosure and an invasion of the
right of privacy. Technically, such an order also constitutes an abuse
of discretion. The order in the Tunks case, rendered in the absence of
an examination of the pertinent documents and a failure to separate
the relevant matters from the irrevelant materials contained in the
income tax returns rendered the discovery order void.
ARTICLE

1735

Article 1735 is narrower in scope and to some extent overlaps the
grant of power granted in Article 1733, which latter article provides
that in addition to judicial bodies or members thereof, the writ of
mandamus may issue to "any officer of the State Government, except
the Governor." Those who may be compelled to act under the provisions of Article 1735 are "any of the officers of the executive departments of the government of this state and also the Board of County and
District Road Indebtedness." The Texas Constitution specifically
designates the officers of the executive department. They are the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Comptroller of Public
Accounts, Treasurer, Commissioner of the General Land Office and the
Attorney General. 41 The Governor is, of course, constitutionally exempt
from the supreme court mandamus, 42 and it has been held that the
phrase "executive officers of the state" embraces only those named
43
in the Texas Constitution.
Article 1735 does not authorize the supreme court to control the discretion of the officers of the Executive Department of the state govern40 Id. at 193-94, 328 S.W.2d 441-42.
41 Id. at 196-97, 328 S.W.2d 443-44.

42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
43 TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 9 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all
unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any
person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
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ment or the Board of County and District Road Indebtedness. It may
compel action, that is, order the parties named to exercise the powers
vested in them, whether they be judicial, ministerial or discretionary in
nature, but the court cannot direct how the power should be exercised
or what should be done, when the act compelled is not ministerial in
nature.

44

MANDAMUS AGAINST THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Attorney General is designated as the head of one of the executive departments of State 45 and is subject to mandamus by the Texas
Supreme Court under Article 1735 as well as Article 1733. A number
of statutes require the Attorney General to examine the bond record
of various governmental or public bodies of the State to ascertain if
the necessary prerequisites of law have been followed. 46 The most
frequent use of the supreme court mandamus is to require an Attorney
General to approve a bond issue. The handling of such issues is a
specialty practice but certain aspects thereof may be noticed here.
The writ has been effectively employed to compel approval of bonds
issued by a city, 47 a water district 4 8 and other public authorities. 49 When
44

TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
45TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3; McFall v. State Board of Education, 101 Tex. 572, 110 S.W.
739 (1908).
46 Betts v. Johnson, 96 Tex. 360, 73 S.W. 4 (1903); Texas Liquor Control Board v. Continental Distilling Sales Co., 199 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd).
47 United Production Corp. v. Hughes, 137 Tex. 21, 152 S.W.2d 327 (1941).
48 TEX. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
49 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 709 (Examination of bonds; municipal and county);
2670 (Purchase of bonds); 4398 (To examine bonds); 709a (Approval of bonds of improve
ment districts of home rule cities); 709b (Home rule cities; validation of bonds); 717a § I
(Refunding Bonds; unorganized counties since organized); 752y (Public Road Bonds validated: Tax levy); 802b-1 § 4 (Home rule cities-specified utilities-authorized to issue
funding bonds or warrants); 802b-2 § 4 (Refunding Bonds-Issuance by cities operating
under charters); 802b-4 § 5 (Exposition and convention halls or coliseum bonds, refunding,
cities over 100,000); 802b-5 § 4 (Bonds to pay existing judgments-Home rule or special
charter cities); 802c § 3 (Refunding bonds of cities operating utilities); 802d § 4 (Refunding
bonds of cities whose streets link state highways); 835e-1 § 1 (Refunding bonds); 1109a § 6
(extension or enlargement of water system); I109i § 6 (Trinity River Authority-Bonds);
Illla § 1 (Additional Bonds; Refunding bonds; water or sewer systems; cities or towns);
llllb § 3 (Public utilities, improving and extending); 1118n-3 § 4 (Refunding Bonds;
issuance by cities operating under general law and owning water works or sewer systems);
1118n-4 § 8 (Redemption of outstanding revenue bonds: additional revenue bonds); 1118u
§ 2 (Water works, sewer systems and swimming pools, revenue bonds); 1182c-4 (Issuance
by cities over 500,000 in lieu of unissued bonds of annexed water district); 1182c-4 § I
(Bonds issued in lieu of unissued bonds of annexed water district); 1187b § 6 (Public improvement bonds, cities on navigable streams); 1187e (c) (Refunding bonds; cities on navigable streams); 1269k § 17 (Housing authorities); 2372d-1 § 2 (Agriculture and livestock
exhibition buildings); 2613a-1 § 5 (Agriculture and mechanical college); 2613a-4 § 9 (Agriculture and mechanical college); 2613a-6 § 7 (Tarleton State dormitories); 26 4 3g § 3
(Building and Improvements; Lamar State and Texas Southern University); 2654c-1 § 9
Capital improvements-collegiate level-educational institution); 2654g, art. 1I, § 1 (College student loan program); 2786b § 4 (Assumption of bonded indebtedness by school dis-
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the Attorney General's refusal to approve bonds was based upon a
decision of the court of civil appeals holding a statute invalid, the
Texas Supreme Court declared the statute valid and stated its disagreement with the court of civil appeals and directed that mandamus
issue. 50 Since the object and purpose of the writ is to compel the performance of a duty imposed by law upon the Attorney General, relator
must show that he has no other adequate means of redress and that
the Attorney General has clearly failed to perform a ministerial duty
imposed on him by law. 51 Also, before a writ of mandamus will lie in
connection with the approval of a bond issue, the relator must establish that he has complied with the requisite statutes authorizing the
bonds and that a demand has been made upon the Attorney General
for approval. For example, Article 709 providing for the approval
of county or municipal bond issues, contains a phrase which states,
"Such county judge or mayor shall also furnish the Attorney General
with any additional information he may require." This phrase vests
some discretion with the Attorney General to require additional information before approval. 52 However, in accordance with the general
rule governing mandamus, when it appears that the applicable statutes
have been complied with the Attorney General's duty becomes ministerial and he has no alternative other than to approve the issue. However, the statutory duty must be unequivocal, unconditioned and
present and the Attorney General cannot be forced to grant conditional
tricts when boundaries are extended); 2789c § 3 (Refunding bonds to pay tax anticipation
notes or certificates of indebtedness; independent school districts); 2802e-1 § 6 (Construction and mortgaging of gymnasia, stadia, etc., by districts authorized; self-liquidating;
proceedings validated; required bonds); 2802f-2 § 3 (Refunding bonds to pay delinquent
tax notes or certificates); 2815g-18 § 2 (Independent school district; refunding indebtedness
on segregation from another district); 2815h-5 § 2 (Refunding bonds of junior college districts); 2909a § 7 (Capital improvements; educational institution); 4437e § 13 (Hospital
4494
p § 5 (Hospital districts; Optional Hospital DisAuthorities; Hospital Authority Act);
trict Law of 1957); 5421m § 3 (Veteran's Land Board); 7807c § 1 (Refunding bonds; water
and improvement; irrigation district); 7807m § 5 (Supplying water to military camps:
water improvement districts); 7880-147x-147z (Water control and improvement district
bonds); 7937 (Fresh water supply district); 7941a (Refunding bonds); 8018 (Refunding
bonds; Levee improvement districts); 8132 (Drainage District; drainage bonds); 8150 (Investment for benefit of district); 8176a § 4 (Refunding bonds; conversion of drainage disstrict into conservation and reclamation districts); 8197b (Conservation and reclamation
district refunding bonds); 8197d § 3 (Conservation and reclamation improvement and
maintenance bonds); 8263e § 46 (Navigation districts creating self-liquidating and supporting districts); 8263g § 3 (Refunding bonds; navigation districts); 8280-9 § 4 (Texas Water
Development Board); 8280-107 § 10 (Lower Colorado River Authortiy); 8280-203 (Jefferson
Water and Sewer District System); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3a: School districts; TEx. CONST.
art. VII, § 18: University of Texas, Texas A & M; bonds payable from income of permanent University Fund.
50 City of Waco v. Mann, 133 Tex. 163, 127 S.W.2d 879 (1939).
51 Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District No. 1 v. Pollard, 118 Tex.
138, 12 S.W.2d 137 (1929).
52 Texas Turnpike Authority v. Shepperd, 154 Tex. 357, 279 S.W.2d 302 (1955).
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approval of a new bond issue designed to take up a previous issue in
the absence of proof of a satisfactory arrangement to carry out the
53
details of the refunding program.
If there be doubt as to the Attorney General's duty, the writ will
not issue. 54 The original jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court to
issue writs of mandamus to the Attorney General cannot be exercised
to decide issues invoked in pending litigation before a district, court
and the Attorney General cannot be compelled to approve a bond issue
which is the subject of pending litigation.5 5 The writ has also been
denied when it appears that proper notice was not given as to the
securities to be issued, 56 or that necessary parties are not before the
court.

57

USE OF THE WRIT IN CONNECTION WITH
PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTIONS

Article 1735a, heretofore set out, grants to the Texas Supreme Court
and the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals the authority to issue the writ
of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by law
upon any public officer, officer of a political party, judge or clerk of an
election in connection with the holding of any general, special or
primary election or any convention of a political party.58
In Love v. Wilcox5r it was held that the act giving the Texas Supreme
Court and the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals concurrent jurisdiction
with that of the trial courts to issue writs of mandamus in election
cases was constitutional. The court reasoned that it was the intent of
the Texas Constitution and statutes passed thereunder that the remedy
53 Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District No. I v. Pollard, 118 Tex.
138, 12 S.W.2d 137 (1929).
54 City of Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 143 S.W.2d 1028 (1940).
55 Trinity River Authority v. Carr, 386 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Sup. 1965).
56 City of Huntsville v. McCraw, 130 Tex. 121, 108 S.W.2d 204 (1937).
57 City of Killeen v. Sheppard, 155 Tex. 13, 291 S.W.2d 728 (1953); City of Houston v.
Allred, 123 Tex. 35, 66 S.W.2d 655 (1934).
58 The election code also contains a provision relating to mandamus of officers or officials
connected with primary elections and party conventions. TEx. ELECrION. CODE ANN. art.
13.41 (Supp. 1968-69) provides:
Any executive committee or committeeman or primary officer or other person
charged under any provision of this code with any duty relative to the holding of the
primary election, or the canvassing, determination or declaration of the result thereof,
or the holding of any party convention, may be compelled by mandamus to perform
the same in accordance with the provisions of this code.
59 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515 (1930).
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of mandamus-should be pursued in the lower courts in the absence of
an urgent necessity calling for the exercise of the original jurisdiction
of an appellate court. As the purpose of the power was to protect the
general rights and interests of the people and State, the court sustained.
the legislative act vesting it with a jurisdiction to be exercised in cases
of urgent necessity. The court pointed out that ordinarily rights may
be enforced in a mandamus proceeding by suit in the district court,
appealed to the court of civil appeals, and brought to the Texas
Supreme Court by writ of error and that it is only when these remedies
are incomplete or inadequate that the Texas Supreme Court will exercise its original jurisdiction. However, a writ will not issue if there
be a fact question affecting the rights of the parties.6 0 Mandamus will
issue against county officials if they are members of election boards or
if action by them is required to give the plaintiff the relief he is
entitled to.61
Although the Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to issue
original injunctions, it may issue ancillary restraining writs to effecuate its mandamus powers. When it is shown that a relator is entitled
to a writ of mandamus and an injunction is essential to his securing
the relief he is entitled to, such writ may issue against an election
62
board or official.
A writ of mandamus will issue to compel an election board or official
to canvass the votes cast at an election and certify the result of such
election6 3 and, in a proper case, to compel a party executive committee
64
to place a person's party's name upon a primary ballot.
Mandamus has been refused under various factual circumstances.
When it appears that one has been an unsuccessful candidate in the
Democratic primary, his supporters may not obtain a writ ordering the
Secretary of State to place his name on the general election ballot as
the candidate of another political party 5 or as an independent can60 Dick v. Kazen, 156 Tex. 122, 292 S.W.2d 913 (1956); Ferris v. Carlson, 314 S.W.2d 295
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, no writ); Donald v. Carr, 407 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1966, no writ); Stevens v. Link, 433 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968,
no writ).
61 Benavides v. Atkins, 132 Tex. 1, 120 S.W.2d 415 (1938).
62 Lane v. Ross, 151 Tex. 268, 249 S.W.2d 591 (1952); Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28
S.W.2d 515 (1930); Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063 (1926).
63 Grant v. Ammerman, 437 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
64 Spears v. Davis, Calhoun v. Davis, 398 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Sup. 1966); Love v. Wilcox,
119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515 (1930); Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692, 181 S.W.2d 269 (1944);
Westervelt v. Yates, 145 Tex. 38, 194 S.W.2d 395 (1946); Burris v. Gonzalez, 269 S.W.2d 696
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, no writ).
65 Rummler v. Reavley, 156 Tex. 138, 293 S.W.2d 638 (1956).
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didate; 66 nor, will the writ issue when the prospective candidate is
ineligible to hold the office which he seeks, 67 or when it appears that
because of a residence qualification, the prospective candidate is ineligible for a place on the ballot. 68 It has also been held that mandamus
will not issue directing that a candidate's name be placed upon the
ballot upon the theory that an incumbent's term of office has expired
when it appears that the incumbent's term was for four years instead
of two as contended by the applicant for mandamus. 69
While the authority to act is actually conferred by Article 1734 rather
than by Article 1735a, it has been held that the Texas Supreme Court
may order the discontinuance of an election contest when it appears
70
that the issues therein have become moot.
ARTICLE 1734-ORDER TO PROCEED TO TRIAL AND JUDGMENT

As heretofore pointed out, the provisions of Article 1734 relating
to the authority to proceed to trial and judgment are practically identi-

cal with those of Article 1824 relating to the jurisdiction of the court
of civil appeals. 71 In this field of concurrent jurisdiction, the decisions
of the courts of civil appeals, while not binding, are persuasive so far
as supreme court action on the point. 72 Ordinarily, an application to
order a district judge to proceed to trial and judgment is first made to
a court of civil appeals 73 and while no appeal lies to the Texas Supreme
Court from the action of a court of civil appeals upon matters relating
to the original jurisdiction of those courts, the orders of the courts of
civil appeals may be superseded by an exercise of original jurisdiction
74
by the Texas Supreme Court.
Prior to 1953, the writ of mandamus from the supreme court was
66Westerman v. Mims, 111 Tex. 29, 227 S.W. 178 (1921).
67 Purcell v. Lindley, 158 Tex. 541, 314 S.W.2d 283 (1958).
68 Canady v. Democratic Executive Committee of Travis County, 381 S.W.2d 321 (Tex.
Sup. 1964). The court of civil appeals had ordered the name of Curtis Lacy placed upon
the primary ballot as a candidate for Justice of the Peace, Precinct 3, Place I of Travis
County. This order was superseded by the Texas Supreme Court decision.
60 Eades v. Drake, 160 Tex. 381, 332 S.W.2d 553 (1960).
70 Polk v. Davidson, 145 Tex. 200, 196 S.W.2d 632 (1946).
71 See comments on Jurisdiction in forepart of this paper.
72 See, Norvell, Original Jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil Appeals to Issue Extraordinary Writs, 8 Sw. L.J. 389 (1954).
73 Houtchens v. Mercer, 119 Tex. 244, 27 S.W.2d 795 (1930).
74 Houtchens v. Mercer, 119 Tex. 244, 27 S.W.2d 795 (1930); State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex.
60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939); Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 388 S.W.
2d 409 (Tex. Sup. 1965); Gulf C.&S.F. Ry. Co. v. Muse, 109 Tex. 352, 207 S.W. 897 (1919);
Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 175, 268 S.W. 715 (1925); Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Watkins,
126 Tex. 116, 86 S.W.2d.1081. (1935) and cases cited; Canady v. Democratic Executive Committee of Travis County, 381 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
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available to a litigant to compel a court of civil appeals to certify a
question to the Texas Supreme Court in cases in which a decision of
the court of civil appeals was in conflict with a prior decision of another
court of civil appeals or with a decision of the supreme court.7 5 However, since the amendments to Articles 172876 and 182177 in 1953, the

mandamus remedy is no longer available for the reason that there now
exists an adequate remedy by application for writ of error.
The original writ of mandamus is often used to compel a district
judge to enter judgment upon a verdict of the jury. Prior to the introduction of the special issue verdict in Texas in 1913, the entry of a
judgment upon a general verdict was regarded as a ministerial act
which could be compelled by mandamus. 78 The same rule is applicable
to a special issue verdict, although there are unique features involved.
Under the Texas practice, the granting of a new trial rests within the
absolute discretion of the trial judge. 79 Therefore, before mandamus
will issue the record must show that the only reason the trial judge
did not render judgment on a special issue verdict was his belief that
there was one or more irreconcilable conflicts among the jury's findings. 80 If the Texas Court of Civil Appeals or the Texas Supreme Court
finds that there is no conflict in the special issues, an order to render
judgment will be issued upon the theory that a ministerial duty only
is involved and the situation is legally the same as that presented by
a general verdict.
The question of whether or not a special issue verdict is conflicting
may present difficulty and the courts have devised certain tests to solve
the problem. In Little Rock Furniture Company v. Dunn," a "test"
of the existence of a conflict was approved. The court examines each
of the answers alleged to be in conflict, disregarding the claimed conflicting answer but taking into consideration the rest of the verdict,
and if, so considered, one of the answers would require a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and the other would require a judgment in favor
of the defendant, then the answers are in fatal conflict. The court stated:
It is essential that the party seeking to set aside a verdict on the
ground of conflict must be able to point out that one of the con75

Simpson v. McDonald, 142 Tex. 444, 179 S.W.2d 239 (1944).

76 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1728 (1962).
77*Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1821 (1964).

78 Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1 (1871); cf. Williams v. Wyrick, 151 Tex. 40, 245 S.W.2d 961

(1952).

Aycock v. Kimbrough, 71 Tex. 330, 12 S.W. 71 (1887).
Friske v. Graham, 128 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1939, no writ).
81 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949).
79
80
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flicting answers of the jury, in connection with the rest of the
verdict except the issue with which it conflicts, necessarily requires,
the entry2 of a judgment different from that which the court has
entered.
8
This "Little Rock rule" was qualified in Bradford v. Arhelger.
In Bradford, there was a conflict in the jury's findings in response to
the special issues submitted in that the jury found that (1) plaintiff's
negligence had been a proximate cause of the automobile collision, (2)
defendant's negligence had been a proximate cause of the collision and
(3) the collision was the result of an unavoidable accident. As to these
issues the court reasoned as follows:

If we disregard the finding of unavoidable accident but take
into consideration all of the rest of the verdict, a judgment for the
defendant would be required because of the finding that the
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. If
we disregard the finding that the defendant's negligence was a
proximate cause of the collision and consider all of the rest of the
verdict, a judgment for the defendant would also be required
because there would be no finding that the defendant was negligent or that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. * * * If we disregard the finding of unavoidable accident
and consider all of the rest of the verdict, a judgment for the
defendant would be required because of the finding that the
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. If we
disregard the finding that the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision and consider all of the rest of the verdict,
we are left with findings that the defendant's negligence was a
proximate cause of the collision and that the collision was an
unavoidable accident. Quite obviously, in that situation a judgment could not be rendered for the defendant. The situation
which then confronts us is just as though the jury had found that
the plaintiff was not negligent, that the defendant's negligence
was a proximate cause of the collision and that the collision was
an unavoidable accident. Such findings are themselves in fatal
conflict and will not suprnort a judgment. Bransford v. Pageway
Coaches, 129 Tex. 327, 104 S.W.2d 471; Texas Interurban Railway Co. v. Hughes, Tex. Com. App., 53 S.W.2d 448.84
The court concluded that "'the Little Rock' rule must be qualified,
for we cannot permit a verdict to stand when the findings are in such
82

Id. at 206, 222 S.W.2d at 991.

83 340 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Sup. 1960).
84

Id. at 773.
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conflict that an application of the Little Rock rule develops a situation
in which a judgment cannot be entered for either party."8
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Collins,". the court
held that when a jury disregarded instructions and improperly answered conditionally submitted issues, such "extra-findings" could
not be disregarded in order to resolve a conflict. The court said:
The use of conflict-avoiding "formulas" such as Mr. McDonald,
supra, describes as "escape mechanisms" that "give ample room for
metaphysical exercise" (Vol. 3, pp. 1273 and 1275) does, indeed,
serve the generally laudable purpose of avoiding the trouble,
delay and expense of new trials. But, since such rules are essentially
somewhat "technical" in tending to resolve, at the expense of one
of the litigants, a situation wherein the intent of the jury is
actually in doubt, new ones should not be adopted nor the established ones extended, except with considerable caution. With this
policy in mind we conclude that justice will be better served in
the instant and similar cases by not disregarding the answers creating the conflict, even though they were given in violation of the
conditions attached to the corresponding issues. We thus avoid
a final decision based on findthe not at all unlikely possibility of
87
ings that the jury did not intend.
Similarly, in City of Panhandle v. Byrd it was held that an erroneously submitted issue could serve as the basis of a conflict.88
While the cases immediately above cited were decided upon appeal
rather than in original mandamus proceedings, the rules therein set
forth are applicable to those mandamus cases wherein it is asserted
that a trial judge failed to render a judgment because of a mistaken
belief that there was conflict in the jury findings. Because of the rule
applicable to those situations wherein the Texas Supreme Court and
the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals have concurrent jurisdiction which
requires that an application for mandamus be first presented to a court
of civil appeals, the majority of cases in.this category-ordering a
district judge to proceed to trial and judgment-are those decided by
the courts of civil appeals.
85 Id.

at 774.

86 156 Tex. 376, 295 S.W.2d 902 (1956).
87 Id. at 381-82, 295 S.W.2d 905-6.
88 City of Panhandle v. Byrd, 130

Tex. 96, 106 S.W.2d 660 (1937), wherein the court
said:
The court should not have submitted the requested issue. It comprehended but one
element of the ultimate issue of proximate cause, which had been submitted in the
main charge. But our question is not whether it should have been submitted. It is one
of conflict of findings, and we are unable to reconcile them on any reasonable ground.
They are so conflicting on a material and essential issue in the case as to be mutually
destructive.
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ENFORCE AND PROTECT JURISDICTION

The Texas Supreme Court possesses a constitutional grant of
authority to issue the writs necessary to enforce and protect its jurisdiction. This provision states in part:
[t]he said courts and the justices thereof may issue the writs of
mandamus, procedendo, certiorari, and such other writs, as may
be necessary to enforce its jurisdiction.s 9
This power to issue the writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of
the Texas Supreme Court has been held to find its sanction in the
Texas Constitution and exists apart from statutory omissions or declarations. 90 However, before the supreme court can issue such a writ
for this purpose, it must have potential appellate jurisdiction over the
case resulting from a final judgment or an appealable order of the
district court.91 The Texas Courts of Civil Appeals possess the same
2
power by legislative enactment.
The power to enforce and protect its jurisdiction is held to be a
power which is essential to the existence of the court and is a proper
exercise of its unquestioned jurisdiction. This would include the
authority to compel the performance of those essential acts provided
by law and the rules of appellate procedure to bring cases before it
for review. 93
As a corollary, the Texas Supreme Court may issue those writs necessary to give force and effect to its judgments. 94 This authority includes
the power to issue a writ of injunction, a writ which the Texas Supreme
Court does not otherwise possess, 9 and may be directed against the
parties to the suit in order to protect its judgments. 96 The writ of
mandamus has been held to be but "the means" or "execution" to
enforce the judgment in favor of those to whom the writ has been
awarded. 97 Where there would otherwise be a failure of justice, the
writ of mandamus is available to enforce a judgment and enjoin further
litigation because there is no other established remedy.98
89
90
91
92
93

Tax. CONST. art. V, § 3.
Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063 (1926).
Grigsby v. Bowles, 79 Tex. 138, 15 S.W. 30 (1890).
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1823 (1964).
Roth v. Murray, 105 Tex. 6, 141 S.W. 515 (1911); Park v. Archer, 158 Tex. 274, 311

S.W.2d 231 (1958).
94 Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company v. City of Beaumont, 373 S.W.2d 741
(Tex. Sup. 1964).
95 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Kirby, 137 Tex. 106, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941); Lane v.

Ross, 151 Tex. 268, 249 S.W.2d 591 (1952).
96 Sparenberg v. Lattimore, 134 Tex. 671, 139 S.W.2d 77 (1940).
97 Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 175, 268 S.W. 715 (1925).
98 Id.
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In City of Dallas v. Dixon, 9 the Texas Supreme Court held that

it had jurisdiction to compel a court of civil appeals by writ of mandamus to enforce its own jurisdiction and to protect its own judgments.
The court reasoned that a court of civil appeals is under a mandatory
duty to protect its jurisdiction and judgments. In this case the parties
sought to relitigate issues after the Texas Supreme Court had refused
to issue a writ of error from the court of civil appeals. The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals refused to issue the necessary writs to prohibit
relitigation of the suit. The Texas Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice Calvert, stated:
Interference with enforcement of a court's judgment is interference
with its jurisdiction, and the quoted constitutional and statutory
provisions confer jurisdiction on Courts of. Civil Appeals to issue
whatever writs are necessary, including the writ of injunction, to
enforce their judgments. 00
And we hold, further, that exercise of such jurisdiction is mandatory when an actual interference with enforcement of the judgment is coupled with the second suit or when the mere prosecution of the suit destroys the efficacy of the judgment. 01'
By the use of the writ of mandamus and other available writs, the
Texas Supreme Court is protecting its jurisdiction by guaranteeing
absolute finality to its judgments. Thus, it appears that the use of a writ
of mandamus is an effective, though seldom needed, remedy to enforce
and protect the jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court.
99 City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Sup. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Donovan v.
City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 88 S. Ct. 1579, 12 L. Ed. 409. The reversal was to the effect
that state courts were without power to enjoin the litigants from prosecuting the present
action in the Federal District Court and, further, that it was for the federal court to decide
whether or not a plea of res judicata in the second suit would be good.
100 City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
101 Id. at 925.
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